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EXTREME TEMPERATURE AND EXTREME VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE
FROM RUSSIA
VLADIMIR OTRACHSHENKO, OLGA POPOVA and JOSÉ TAVARES
We study the relationship between extreme temperatures and violent mortality,
employing novel regional panel data from Russia. We find that extremely hot temper-
atures increase violent mortality, while extremely cold temperatures have no effect. The
impact of hot temperature on violence is unequal across gender and age groups, rises
noticeably during weekends, and leads to considerable social costs. Our findings also
suggest that better job opportunities and lower vodka consumption may decrease this
impact. The results underscore that economic policies need to target vulnerable popula-
tion groups to mitigate the adverse impact of extreme temperatures. (JEL Q54, I14, K42)
“For now, these hot days, is the mad blood stirring.”
William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act 3,
Scene 1
I. INTRODUCTION
“[T]he prime time for murder is clear:
summertime,” states The New York Times.
Heightened social interactions and the presence
of biological and psychological triggers that
prompt violence partially explain why, “in the
summer months, the bad guys tend to be dead-
liest” (Lehren and Baker 2009). Global climate
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change is persistently debated in policy circles
and in the media. Beyond the physical changes
in the Earth’s environment, it is important to
examine possible changes in human behavior
having social and economic consequences.
Documenting the empirical link between rising
temperatures and specific social consequences is
a crucial, and quite demanding, task.
The most ubiquitous weather-behavior link-
age advanced in biology and psychology is the
relationship between uncomfortable temper-
atures and aggressive individual behavior.1
In the first review of psychological liter-
ature, Anderson (1989) claimed that the
temperature–aggression relationship is com-
plex, and laboratory experiments fail to provide
robust evidence on it. As suggested by the author,
more field and within-country studies are needed
to document more precisely whether uncom-
fortable temperature and aggression have a J-
or U-shaped relationship. In a J-shaped form,
only hot temperatures prompt aggression, while
cold temperatures do not affect it, while in a
1. For reviews, see Anderson (1989), Anderson
et al. (2000), and Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel (2013). A grow-
ing body of research also suggests that climate change fosters
conflict and warfare. For instance, Burke et al. (2009) and
Hsiang, Meng, and Cane (2011) show that weather shocks
plausibly impact political stability. Burke and Leigh (2010)
and Bruckner and Ciccone (2011) document that weather
shocks appear to lead to democratization. Dell, Jones, and
Olken (2012) show that adverse temperature shocks increase
the probability of irregular leader transitions (i.e., coups).
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U-shaped form, both cold and hot temperatures
increase aggression. In economics, the literature
has so far focused on the heat-crime relationship
and barely examined whether uncomfortably
low temperatures affect violent and aggressive
individual behavior. The first economic study
of the impact of extreme temperatures on crime
was presented by Ranson (2014), who analyzed
U.S. historical data and uncovered a positive
association between hot weather and crime,
extrapolating long-term effects for different sce-
narios. Recently, Blakeslee and Fishman (2018)
have also shown that hot temperature increases
violent crime in India. By examining the impact
of both extremely hot and extremely cold tem-
peratures, our paper offers an important insight to
the ongoing discussion in the literature regarding
the shape of the temperature–crime relationship.
We fill this gap in knowledge by examining
the consequences of extreme temperatures in
Russia, a country with a wide range of observed
temperatures and one of the highest incidence
rates of violence.2
This paper examines the impact of uncom-
fortably hot and cold days on violent mortality
and its unequal incidence across gender and age
groups by exploring a dataset on temperature and
violence across 79 regions of the Russian Feder-
ation between 1989 and 2015. We draw on the
cultural, geographic, and climatic diversity of the
Russian Federation to estimate the likely impact
of an additional high and low temperature day
on violent acts. These are individual violent acts
leading to death occurring in the course of daily
life interactions, not acts driven by political or
social unrest. The relevance of our results can-
not be escaped, especially as the effects of change
may become more acute, and as suggested by
other studies, the impact of hot days on mortality
may be greater in developing countries.3 Violent
acts by individuals are hard to predict, so that any
2. According to Soares and Naritomi (2010), Russia is
burdened by the largest present value social cost of violence
from reduced life expectancy as a share of GDP, immedi-
ately after Latin America and the Philippines. Our unique
dataset allows us to examine violence perpetrated against
women and against men across age groups, on weekdays, and
on weekends.
3. Burgess et al. (2017) repeat the exercise reported in
Deschênes and Greenstone (2011) for India and find that
an additional day with temperatures exceeding 36∘C leads
to a rise in the annual mortality rate in India that is about
seven times higher than for the United States. These are
computed relative to a day in the 22–24∘C range. For the
effects of temperature on mortality, see also Karlsson and
Ziebarth (2018) for Germany and Otrachshenko, Popova, and
Solomin (2017, 2018) for Russia.
information that helps us reduce victimization is
important and valuable.4
Our paper makes three distinct contributions
to the temperature–crime literature. We are
the first to examine the temperature–violence
relationship in Russia, an upper-middle-income
economy with a wide range of observed tem-
peratures and the institutional context that is
substantially different from existing studies on
the United States. Moreover, we are the first to
document that severe cold temperatures do not
impact the violent mortality. We also outline in
detail the mechanisms behind the relationship
between temperature and violence, examine the
heterogeneity of the impact by different popu-
lation groups, and quantify the socioeconomic
costs of the temperature–violence linkage. As
such, our paper fundamentally revises insights
from earlier papers and offers an original
contribution to the literature.
Though only the “tip of the iceberg,” eval-
uating the impact on murders overcomes, in
part, the underreporting of physical violence
and associated consequences, including psycho-
logical violence, the latter naturally also being
important.5 We find that days with average tem-
peratures above 25∘C lead to an increase in both
female and male victims, while days with lower
temperatures do not affect violent mortality.6
The likelihood of victimization during week-
ends, as opposed to workdays, rises noticeably
for females, suggesting different contexts for the
emergence of violence. Our findings also suggest
that in regions with higher unemployment and
with greater consumption of spirits, the likeli-
hood of victimization during hot days is greater.
This suggests that improving economic condi-
tions may help to mitigate the harmful effects of
temperature shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 details the conceptual
framework underlying the relationship between
4. Hereinafter by “victimization” we mean the process
of being victimized or becoming a victim.
5. Cerqueira and Soares (2016) show results indicating
that the total welfare cost of homicides in Brazil corresponds
to about 78% of Gross Domestic Product, and the yearly
welfare cost is about 2.3%.
6. Deschênes and Greenstone (2011) document the rela-
tionship between daily temperatures and annual mortality
rates, with both relationships exhibiting nonlinearities, with
significant increases at the extremes of the temperature dis-
tribution. The estimates in Deschênes and Greenstone (2011)
suggest that climate change will lead to an increase in the age
adjusted US mortality rate of 3% by the end of the twenty-
first century.
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violence and weather and discusses the ear-
lier literature. Sections 3 and 4 describe the
background of our study and data. Method-
ology and estimation results are presented in
Sections 5 and 6, respectively. The last section
offers conclusions.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RELATED
LITERATURE
A. Conceptual Framework
The impact of weather on violence can be
explained from both the supply and demand
sides. On the supply side, weather may affect
the behavior of potential criminals. On the
demand side, weather may affect the behavior of
potential victims. Below we outline the possible
channels on the supply and demand side in
more detail.
On the supply side there are three theories
that may explain the impact of weather on vio-
lence, including economic theory of rational
decision making, biological theory, and contact
theory.
Becker’s model—the canonical model of
crime—implies a decrease in crime on hot and
cold days, if heat/cold increases the cost of sup-
ply of crime. In Becker (1968), an individual’s
decision to commit a crime is based on rational
consideration of the costs and benefits of the act.
In this model, the weather is an input that affects
the probability of successfully completing a
crime and the probability of escaping undetected
thereafter. This explanation has empirical support
in cases of cold temperatures, since cold weather
associated with natural obstacles to violent crime
such as lower mobility due to snow drift, closed
doors and windows, and so on (Ranson 2014;
Vrij, Van Der Steen, and Koppelaar 1994). How-
ever, explaining violence also requires going
beyond strictly rational explanations as it may
occur as an impulse, not just the result of a search
for greater individual utility.
The biological explanation is summed up in
Simister and Cooper (2005), who suggest that the
human body reacts to both extremely cold and
extremely hot temperatures by producing stress
hormones, including adrenaline, noradrenaline,
and testosterone. This leads to the expansion
of the blood vessels, increased heart rate and
blood pressure, stimulated respiration, focused
attention, and heightened anxiety. These same
bodily effects are also present when the human
body and human brain need to mobilize for
action and possible aggression, during stress-
ful or dangerous situations. Noradrenaline is
also associated with higher anger levels (Simis-
ter and Cooper 2005). Moreover, the interac-
tion of noradrenaline and testosterone fosters
aggression (Kemper 1990). Generally, existing
epidemiological studies suggest that hot temper-
atures are more closely related to hormone acti-
vation than cold temperatures, as warm clothes
reduce the body stress stemming from the cold
(Anderson 1989).
Another biological link between weather and
violence is psychological. Anderson (1989) sug-
gests that violent crime and aggressive behavior
during extreme temperatures are driven by an
emotional or instinctive state of arousal of the
nervous system. Anderson (1989) argues that
both extremely hot and cold temperatures are
uncomfortable for the human body, facilitating
aggression. However, while the relationship
between hot temperatures and violence is sup-
ported by early laboratory experiments, as in
Baron and Bell (1976), findings related to cold
temperatures are inconclusive.7
A third possible explanation for the relation-
ship between heat and aggression is an increased
frequency in social contacts (Anderson 1989). As
people spend more time outside, get together in
larger numbers, and go on vacations, opportuni-
ties for violent interactions increase. However,
Anderson (1987) and Rotton and Frey (1985)
find no empirical support for the interactions-
violence explanation and suggest that the impact
of extreme temperatures on aggression and crime
is not necessarily mediated by the frequency of
social contacts.
On the demand side, weather may reduce
violence by making potential victims more cau-
tious during extreme days. Existing research
suggests that people call for police service more
often during hot weather (Auliciems and DiBar-
tolo 1995; Brunsdon et al. 2009; Cohn 1993)
and less often during cold weather (LeBeau and
Corcoran 1990), walk faster during extremely hot
(Rotton, Shats, and Standers 1990) and extremely
cold days (Liang et al. 2020). The increased level
of adrenaline in the blood on hot days may also
help a potential victim to either run away from
a threat or to use aggression against it (Simister
and Cooper 2005). Temperature may also affect
7. This may stem from contradictory effects of neu-
rotransmitters: while the increase in the level of serotonin
during cold weather slows aggression down (Reis 1974),
another neurotransmitter, acetylcholine, triggers aggression
(Myers 1974).
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violence via changes in law enforcement. For
instance, in periods of hot ambient tempera-
ture, police officers tend to be more aggressive
toward suspects (Vrij, Van Der Steen, and Kop-
pelaar 1994) and more likely to issue traffic
citations (Ryan 2020). However, police officers
are also more likely to be assaulted or killed
during hot days (Annan-Phan and Ba 2019).
All explanations cited guide our empiri-
cal analysis and are naturally interrelated. In
fact, according to Pakiam (1981), a multiple
causation theory of crime prevails, whereby
“anthropological-biological, socio-economic
and physical environmental causes are possible,
with a crime finally being triggered by appro-
priate psychological and physiological changes”
(p. 185). While we cannot separate the above-
discussed mechanisms from each other, the
theoretical underpinnings suggest the following
hypotheses regarding the impact of hot and cold
temperatures on violence:
H1a: Extremely hot temperature increases violence.
H1b: Extremely cold temperature reduces violence.
B. Existing Literature
External conditions, including weather con-
ditions, have been shown to affect human judg-
ment and facilitate aggression. For instance, in
periods of hot ambient temperature, judges make
stricter decisions (Heyes and Saberian 2019),
strikes and job quits are more frequent (Simister
and Cooper 2005),8 drivers sound their horn more
often (Kenrick and MacFarlane 1986), and even
baseball pitchers hit batters more often (Larrick
et al. 2011; Reifman, Larrick, and Fein 1991).
Early psychological and epidemiological
studies suggest a positive correlation between
hot temperatures and crime in the United States
(Anderson 1987; Rotton and Frey 1985).9 Rot-
ton and Frey (1985) find a positive correlation
between hot temperatures and assaults, while
Anderson (1987) suggests that this correlation
is stronger for violent crimes against other
persons—e.g., murders, rapes, and assaults, than
8. In the 1960s “U.S. government officials noted that
riots were more likely to occur in warmer weather, and subse-
quent analysis confirmed this relationship” (Dell, Jones, and
Olken 2014, 768, who refer to Carlsmith and Anderson 1979;
U.S. Riot Commission 1968).
9. For a review of psychological literature on tempera-
ture and crime, see Cohn (1990) and Anderson (1989).
for violent crimes against property—e.g., rob-
bery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.
Furthermore, Rotton and Cohn (2004) find that
in air-conditioned locations aggravated assaults
are not as likely during hot weather.
In economics, several studies examine the
temperature–crime relationship in the United
States.10 Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti (2007)
and Ranson (2014) have uncovered a positive
association between hot weather and different
types of crime. Ranson (2014) also suggests
that most violent and nonviolent crimes are
significantly reduced during cold weather (below
10∘F), while murders are not affected. The liter-
ature is also inconclusive regarding the effects
of precipitation. Ranson (2014) points out that
precipitation does not affect murders, rapes, rob-
bery, or larceny, decreases assaults, and increases
manslaughter, burglary, and vehicle thefts.
Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti (2007) find that
higher precipitation is associated with a reduc-
tion in violent crime. Recently, in studying the
impact of pollen concentration on the U.S. crime,
Chalfin, Danagoulian, and Deza (2019) use tem-
perature and precipitation as additional controls.
The authors find that precipitation reduces both
violent and property crime. Using data from
India, Blakeslee and Fishman (2018) suggest
that hot temperature (above 32∘C) increases
violent crime and precipitation decreases it,
while property crime is unaffected by either
temperature or precipitation.
The circumstances behind violent acts differ
widely, but it is reasonable to consider whether
victimization falls more heavily on specific gen-
der and age groups. Multicountry studies show
that 15%–75% of all violence against women
is perpetrated by a spouse or domestic partner,
and is more prevalent on weekends, when fam-
ily interactions increase (Aizer 2010; Garcia-
Moreno et al. 2006; Hidrobo and Fernald 2013;
Hindin, Kishor, and Ansara 2008).11 For Rus-
sia, Volkova, Lipai, and Wendt (2015) estimate
10. Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015) conduct a meta-
analysis and suggest that extreme temperature and precip-
itation increase the likelihood of interpersonal and inter-
group conflict.
11. Gantz, Bradley, and Wang (2006) and Card and
Dahl (2011) find that emotional cues associated with the
results in games of professional football in the U.S. increase
the rate of at-home violence by men against their female
partners. Economic difficulties and excessive alcohol con-
sumption also increase the incidence of domestic violence
(Aizer 2010; Bobonis, González-Brenes, and Castro 2013;
Carpenter and Dobkin 2011; Hidrobo and Fernald 2013;
Luca, Owens, and Sharma 2015).
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that 70%–80% of serious violent crimes, and
30%–40% of murders are committed in the fam-
ily, with upwards of 10,000 women killed by
their close partner. Also, analyzing the impact of
weather on violence against females may have
important implications for human capital and
economic development. For instance, to avoid
violence female students in India often compro-
mise on the quality of their education by choosing
lower-ranked colleges over higher-ranked ones
if a travel route to the latter school is safer
(Borker 2017).
For different reasons, related or unrelated to
gender, older individuals may suffer differen-
tial rates of victimization. Otrachshenko, Popova,
and Solomin (2017) investigate the impact of
days with hot temperature on all mortality causes,
as well as cardiovascular-caused mortality, and
respiratory-caused mortality. They find that the
adult, but not elderly, are the most affected, and
people over 60 are relatively less affected. Using
data from the 1990s, Soares and Naritomi (2010)
find that the incidence of violence in Latin Amer-
ica is concentrated in prime age.12 The same is
true for the United States (Levitt 1999), while
Russia has a later age profile, with groups around
40–45 the most victimized.13 There is, however,
evidence that older women may be especially tar-
geted. Miguel (2005) finds that in Tanzania neg-
ative income shocks are associated with a large
increase in the murder, by relatives, of elderly
women, but not other population groups.
Using data for 73 countries, Soares (2006)
estimates that each year of life expectancy lost
to violence corresponds, on average, to 3.8%
of GDP. In Russia, the difference between male
and female life expectancies may be a factor,
as well as the evolution of relative health status
between males and females, with the latter seeing
their health degrading more rapidly over time.
Cerqueira and Soares (2016) also point out that
incorporating heterogeneities such as age and
gender has important effects on the estimated
welfare cost of deadly violence, leading to a 23%
upward correction in total costs.
12. Cerqueira and Soares (2016) explore data from
Brazil and find that men in their 20s are about ten times more
exposed to homicide than women of similar age. Also, men in
their 20s are three times more likely to be victims of homicide
than men in their 40s.
13. In Russia, men in their 20s are about five times
more exposed than women of the same age, and as
exposed as men in their 40s. These are authors’ calcula-
tions based on the Russian Fertility and Mortality Database
(RusFMD 2016).
Therefore, the literature suggests the follow-
ing hypotheses regarding the heterogeneity of
results by gender, age, and work days/weekends:
H2a Extreme temperatures affect violence against
women more strongly than violence against men.
H2b Extreme temperatures affect violence against
middle-aged and elderly more strongly than violence
against younger individuals.
H2c The impact of extreme temperatures is stronger
over weekends as compared to week days.
III. BACKGROUND
Russia is an upper-middle income economy
with the largest territory in the world and a pop-
ulation over 143 million. After the collapse of
the Soviet Union, in 1991, Russia had faced the
transitory period till 2000s. This period was char-
acterized by economic reforms and institutional
changes, high crime and homicide rates, and high
mortality (Kaminski 1996; Schleifer and Treis-
man 2005).14 Currently, the homicide rate in Rus-
sia is remains the highest in Europe and is almost
twice as high as in the United States (United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2019).
Russian regions are homogeneous in terms of
official language, legislation, and law enforce-
ment, but are heterogeneous in terms of climate,
homicide rates, and socioeconomic conditions.
Figure 1 presents the average annual violent mor-
tality rates per million of population in Russian
regions in 1989–2015. As shown in this figure,
in the northern European part of Russia and in
the most Asian part, the homicide rates are higher
than in the central and southern European parts.
Homicide rates also differ by gender and age.
Figure 2 presents the violent mortality rates per
million of population across gender and age
groups in 1989–2015. As shown in this figure,
violent mortality is higher among the prime age
population, and the homicide rates are higher
among males.
The climate of Russia can be predominantly
classified as continental in the European part of
Russia and subarctic in the Asian part. Summers
are warm to hot and winters are very cold in
most regions. In the European part of Russia,
northern and central regions have mostly dry and
14. To ensure that the transition period does not drive our
results, in our robustness checks, we estimate the model for
the post-transition period only. The results do not change.
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FIGURE 1
Map of Average Annual Violent Mortality Rate in Russia Per Million, 1989–2015
Source: Authors’ construction. Computations are based on data from the Federal Statistical Service of the Russian Fed-
eration and the Russian Fertility and Mortality Database (RusFMD 2016). Violent mortality rate is measured per million persons.
FIGURE 2
Average Annual Violent Mortality Rate across Gender and Age Groups Per
Million—Russia—1989–2015
Source: Authors’ computations based on data from the Federal Statistical Service of the Russian Federation and the Russian
Fertility and Mortality Database (RusFMD 2016). Violent mortality rate measured per million persons of the corresponding age
group is presented.
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FIGURE 3
Average Monthly Temperature in June–August in Russia, 1990–2012
Source: Authors’ construction based on data from the Climate Change Knowledge Portal of the World Bank.
sunny summers and cold winters with frost and
snowfall. In the southern European part, summers
are hot and dry, and winters are very cold, except
for the areas around the Black Sea, which have
mild winters with frequent rainfall. The Siberian
part of Russia is known for its extreme weather
with very cold winters and hot summers that are
short and wet. The coldest place in the central
Siberian part is Oymyakon, located in the Sakha
Republic, where the winter temperature can be
below −55∘C in January. Generally, most regions
have even precipitation across seasons, except for
East Siberia and the Far East, where winter is dry
compared to summer.
According to the World Bank the annual aver-
age temperature in Russia from 1990–2012 was
−5.4∘C. The warmest month is July, with the
average monthly temperature 15.1∘C, while the
coldest month is January, with −25.2∘C. As
shown in Figure 3, the average summer tempera-
ture in Russia from 1990–2012 was about 13∘C
with an upward trend.
IV. DATA
We use annual data on violent mortality
rates in 79 regions of the Russian Feder-
ation for the period from 1989 until 2015
from the Russian Federal State Statistics Ser-
vice and the Russian Fertility and Mortality
Database (RusFMD 2016).15 According to the
15. Our dataset includes all regions of the Russian
Federation with the exception of autonomous districts that
International Statistical Classification of Dis-
eases and Related Health Problems by the World
Health Organization (WHO), violent death is
defined as a death from homicide and injury
purposely inflicted by other persons, including
legal execution.16
The data on average daily temperature and
precipitation are collected from 518 meteoro-
logical ground stations and are weighted by an
inverse distance square from the nearest popu-
lation settlement within a 200 km radius. The
settlements within a region are then weighted
based on their population. Ground stations that
are closer to settlements with a larger population
thereby receive the largest weight. This approach
gives us the weather experienced by an average
person in a region (Dell, Jones, and Olken 2014;
Hanigan, Hall, and Dear 2006).17
Figure 4 shows the distribution of days with a
particular mean daily temperature in Russia from
are included in larger territorial units, that is, the Khanty-
Mansi Autonomous District—Yugra and the Yamalo-Nenets
Autonomous District, which are part of a larger Tyumen
oblast, the Nenets Autonomous District, which is a part of the
Arkhangelsk oblast. Also, data for the Chechen Republic are
not available due to the military conflicts there in the 1990s.
16. The death penalty has been indefinitely suspended
and not executed in Russia since 1996. According to archival
data, in the period 1991–1996, 163 persons were executed;
this is 0.07% of the total violent mortality in Russia during
this period.
17. An alternative approach is to use the area-weighted
weather data, which gives “the average weather experienced
by a place” (Dell, Jones, and Olken 2014, 751). As suggested
by Dell, Jones, and Olken (2014), this approach is less pre-
ferred for countries with large scarcely populated regions, e.g.
the US and Russia.
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FIGURE 4
Distribution of Days across Temperature Ranges in Russia, 1989–2015
Source: Authors’ computations. Notes: The intervals in White, (19∘C, 22∘C] and (22∘C, 25∘C], the most comfortable
temperature limits, are used as default. The intervals in Black, (25∘C, 28∘C] and above 28∘C, show the extremely hot temperature.
1989 to 2015. As shown in this figure, the temper-
ature spectrum is divided into 3∘ centigrade inter-
vals. For the empirical analysis, these intervals
are constructed for each region and each year.
Each interval presents the frequency of days with
a particular temperature within a region and year.
In Figure 4 the white bars stand for the frequency
of days with the (19∘C, 22∘C] and (22∘C, 25∘C]
temperature ranges, which are the most comfort-
able temperature limits and used as default. The
black bars stand for the frequency of days with
the (25∘C, 28∘C] and above 28∘C temperature
ranges, showing the extremely hot temperature.
Only two thirds of the regions have experienced
days above 28∘C, and the average number of days
with such temperature is 0.97 per year in our sam-
ple. Thus, in our analysis, we combine the days
above 25∘C into one interval.
On average, a day with the mean temperature
above 25∘C has 33.2∘C during the day and
20.1∘C during the night. Thus, we consider the
days with above 25∘C as extremely hot. Regard-
ing the extremely cold days, an average day with
the mean temperature below −23∘C has −25.6∘C
during the day and −36.3∘C during the night.18
18. We also split the temperature bin below −23∘C into
the [−23∘C and − 26∘C) and below −26∘C temperature bins.
The results are similar and are available upon request.
The data on mean daily precipitation within
a region and a year are divided into terciles:
[0 mm, 10 mm), [10 mm, 20 mm), and between
20 mm and above. The precipitation interval
[0 mm, 10 mm) is used as a default. In case of
both temperature and precipitation, the numbers
of days per year is standardized to 365 days.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on homi-
cide rates and the number of days with extreme
temperature and precipitation. As shown in this
table, the average number of days with temper-
ature above 25∘C is 5.13 per region per year
in our sample. Overall, the 25th percentile of
regions has experienced 0.93 days above 25∘C
per year and the 75th percentile of regions has
experienced 5.52 such days per year during the
period under study. Days below −23∘C are more
frequent. There are 9.5 such days on average
per year with 0.63 days in the 25th percentile of
regions and 12.22 days in the 75th percentile of
regions. There are also on average 2.05 days with
extreme precipitation.
V. METHODOLOGY
To examine the impact of weather on violent
mortality, we follow the econometric approach
suggested by Deschênes and Greenstone (2011),
Burgess et al. (2017), Otrachshenko, Popova, and
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TABLE 1







Number of days above 25∘C 5.13 8.31 0.93 5.52
Number of days below −23∘C 9.50 17.27 0.63 12.22
Number of days with precipitation above 20 mm 2.05 2.03 0.92 2.96
Total homicide rate, persons per million 229.55 164.64 118.51 290.60
Female homicide rate, persons per million 102.89 68.82 54.22 135.44
Male homicide rate, persons per million 371.08 272.48 192.00 469.60
Source: Authors’ computations. All data are averages per year.
Solomin (2017). The econometric model is as
follows:







𝛿kPrecBinrt + 𝜶r + 𝜸t
+𝜱′𝜶r ∗ Trend + 𝜀rt
where the subscripts r and t stand for a region and
year, respectively. Violencert is violent mortality
rate per million persons in a region r and year
t. The temperature spectrum is divided into 3∘
centigrade intervals, yielding 17 intervals with a
particular temperature: below −23∘C, (−23∘C,
−20∘C], (−20∘C, −17∘C], (−17∘C, −14∘C],
(−14∘C, −11∘C], (−11∘C, −8∘C], (−8∘C,
−5∘C], (−5∘C, −2∘C], (−2∘C, 1∘C], (1∘C, 4∘C],
(4∘C, 7∘C], (7∘C, 10∘C], (10∘C, 13∘C], (13∘C,
16∘C], (16∘C, 19∘C], (19∘C, 25∘C], and above
25∘C. TempBinrt stands for the number of days
in a region r and year t in which the mean daily
temperature fell in the j-th of the 17 intervals.
The temperature interval (19∘C, 25∘C] is used
as a default. Similarly, PrecBinrt stands for the
number of days in a region r and year t in which
the mean daily precipitation fell in the n-th of
the 3 intervals: [0 mm, 10 mm), [10 mm, 20 mm),
and between 20 mm and above. The precipitation
interval [0 mm, 10 mm) is used as a default.
𝜶r are regional fixed effects. The fixed effects
estimation controls for region-specific time
invariant unobserved factors that may affect
regional violent mortality rate, for example, the
region-specific quality of medical facilities or
characteristics of regional penitentiary system. 𝜸t
are time fixed effects that control for time varying
factors common across all regions, for example,
the health sector or law enforcement reforms.
Trend is a linear time trend. The interaction term
𝜶r * Trend accounts for any region-specific lin-
ear time trends that may affect violent mortality
rate and also correlate with climate, for example,
trends in regional criminal environment. 𝜺rt is a
stochastic disturbance term while 𝜷, 𝜹, and 𝜱
are the vectors of the model parameters. Standard
errors are clustered at a regional level and are
robust to heteroskedasticity. We discriminate the
impact across gender and age groups and across
work days and weekends. Relevant population
weights are used for all regressions. We also
compute years of life lost by a victim that are
due to the impact of one hot day (above 25∘C).
That is, how many years a victim would live if
she/he were not murdered.
Following the recommendation of Dell,
Jones, and Olken (2014) and consistently with
other studies of the weather-crime relation-
ship (Blakeslee and Fishman 2018; Chalfin,
Danagoulian, and Deza 2019; Ranson 2014), we
do not include any demographic or economic
controls in Equation (1) in order to avoid the
“over-controlling problem.” As pointed out by
Dell, Jones, and Olken (2014), if the model
includes controls that are themselves affected
by weather indicators directly or indirectly, the
estimation does not capture the true net effect
of weather indicators and may lead to biased
estimates. If economic controls are included in
the model the impact of weather is likely to be
underestimated. Nevertheless, in our robustness
checks we provide a model with the logarithm of
gross regional product, unemployment rate, and
the level of education proxied by the number of
students in higher education.
We provide several additional robustness
checks. First, we redefine the size of the temper-
ature bins and divide the temperature spectrum
into 6∘ centigrade intervals instead of 3∘ inter-
vals. Second, to show that the impact of extreme
temperature on violence is contemporaneous,
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we introduce a distributed lag model with two
lags and two leads of temperature bins. Third,
we estimate Equation (1) for the post-transition
period (2000–2015) only. Next, we include
the lagged violence rate in Equation (1), since
it might be the case that in regions with high
current violence rates, we should expect high
violence rates in the next year. Also, we split the
above 25∘C temperature bin into the 25–28∘C
and above 28∘C temperature bins to investigate
whether the impact on violence is greater for
higher temperatures. Finally, we estimate a
count model, following the empirical strategy
suggested by Lindo et al. (2019).
VI. ESTIMATION RESULTS
A. Main Results
In this section we present all results from
Equation 1. All regressions are weighted by the
corresponding population and robust standard
errors are clustered at a regional level.
Table 2 presents the impact of 1 day with a
particular temperature range on violent mortality.
We find that 1 day with an average temperature
above 25∘C is associated with a higher preva-
lence of extreme violence. During a day with
temperature above 25∘C the number of victims
increases by 0.60 persons per million inhabi-
tants. In relative terms, this impact corresponds
to 0.26% increase in the total number of vic-
tims.19 This impact of 1 day of hot temperature is
also sizeable economically. It might be compen-
sated by 0.35% increase in the regional GDP per
capita (see Appendix S1 for details of obtaining
this estimate).
As shown in Table 2, we also find no evi-
dence of the impact of cold temperatures. This
is an interesting finding, implying that the
temperature–violence relationship has a J-shape.
This finding also suggests that global warm-
ing has two important implications for human
well-being: the number of victims may increase
not only due to an increasing number of hot
days, but also to a decreasing number of cold
days. Therefore, we find empirical support for
hypothesis H1a, but do not find support for H1b.
The results are also presented graphically in
Figure 5.
19. The likelihood of being a victim is computed as fol-
lows: 0.26% = (0.6 × 100)/229.55. The number in a denomi-
nator is taken from Figure 2, while the number in a numerator
is taken from Table 2.
TABLE 2
Impact of Temperature on Violent Mortality
Violent mortality
Coef. S.E.
−23∘C and below −0.29 0.50
−23∘C −20∘C −0.65 0.61
−20∘C −17∘C −0.50 0.84
−17∘C −14∘C 0.10 0.66
−14∘C −11∘C −1.02 0.90
−11∘C −8∘C −0.44 0.36
−8∘C −5∘C −0.31 0.51
−5∘C −2∘C −0.42 0.55
−2∘C 1∘C 0.03 0.40
1∘C 4∘C −0.50 0.47
4∘C 7∘C −0.38 0.42
7∘C 10∘C −0.30 0.43
10∘C 13∘C −0.27 0.35
13∘C 16∘C 0.08 0.21
16∘C 19∘C −0.08 0.26
Above 25∘C 0.60*** 0.15
10 mm 20 mm −0.47 0.36
20 mm 100 mm 0.82 1.12
Time fixed effects Yes
Regional fixed effects Yes
Regional linear trends Yes
Number of observations 2,120
Rsq-within 0.76
Notes: Coef. and S.E. stand for coefficients and robust
standard errors that are clustered at a regional level. All
regressions are weighted by the corresponding population.
The temperature interval (19∘C, 25∘C] and the precipitation
interval [0 mm, 10 mm) are used as defaults.
***Significant level at 1%.
To establish whether mechanisms through
which temperature affects violent mortality are
similar to mechanisms that trigger nonviolent
mortality, we also analyze the impact of tem-
perature on nonviolent mortality in Table 3. As
shown in this table, days with most temperature
ranges increase nonviolent mortality.
Furthermore, Figure 6 shows the results on
the impact of temperature on the ratio of violent
to nonviolent mortality. Interestingly, violent
mortality due to hot temperature grows relatively
faster than nonviolent mortality. Our results show
that this impact is likely driven by the impact
of temperature on violence against females (see
Figure A1 in Appendix S1). Those findings
suggest that mechanisms behind the relationship
between temperature and violent and nonviolent
mortality are likely to be different. As suggested
in earlier literature, in the case of nonviolent
mortality, the mechanism is primarily biological.
In particular, ambient temperatures beyond com-
fortable limits induce thermal stress that affects
most human biological systems, including car-
diovascular, respiratory, and cerebrovascular
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FIGURE 5
Impact of Temperature on Violent Mortality.
Notes: The dots represent the estimated coefficients from Table 2 with their 95% confidence interval. All regressions are
weighted by the corresponding population. The temperature interval (19∘C, 25∘C] and the precipitation interval [0 mm, 10 mm)
are used as defaults.
(Deschênes and Moretti 2009; Martens 1998).
This increases the risk of nonviolent death in
case of any uncomfortable temperatures. In the
case of violent mortality, the mechanism behind
the temperature–violence relationship might
be more complex, involving economic, social,
and biological mechanisms that are difficult
to separate.
We next test possible mediating channels
between weather and violence by introducing a
set of regional socioeconomic indicators in our
baseline specification.20 As discussed above,
including economic controls in Equation (1)
may lead to the over-controlling problem since
most economic variables are themselves influ-
enced by weather.21 Thus, we estimate the
model with included economics variables only
20. We are here limited to the post-1995 period, as
data on socioeconomic characteristics are available only after
that date.
21. For instance, see Dell, Jones, and Olken (2012) on the
impact of temperature on economic growth, Graff Zivin and
Neidell (2014) on the impact of temperature on reallocation
of time, Park (2020), Park et al. (2020), and Graff Zivin,
Hsiang, and Neidell (2018) on the impact of temperature
on cognitive performance and educational attainment. As
suggestive evidence, Table A1 in Appendix A shows the
results with the economic variables included. Including these
variables does not affect the main result.
to provide a suggestive evidence on possible
mediating channels.
Table 4 presents our results for the four pos-
sible mediating channels considered, namely: the
natural logarithm of real monthly wage, the rate
of unemployment, the consumption of vodka per
capita, and the natural logarithm of the regional
level of education as measured by the number of
higher education students per 1 million of popu-
lation. As shown in this table, in the model with
regional unemployment the impact of hot temper-
ature is lower than in the baseline specification.
Thus, unemployment may serve as a mediating
channel between temperature and violence. Sim-
ilarly, vodka consumption reinforces the impact
of hot temperature, while the real monthly wage
and education do not alter the impact of hot
temperature on violent mortality. These findings
remain as suggestive evidence of possible medi-
ating channels and can be addressed in greater
depth in the future.
B. Robustness Checks
To check that our results are robust, we ana-
lyze several alternative specifications. We first
redefine the size of the temperature bins. The
results remain the same when we divide the tem-
perature spectrum into 6∘ centigrade intervals
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TABLE 3
Impact of Temperature on Nonviolent Mortality
Nonviolent Mortality
Coef. S.E.
−23∘C and below 19.58*** 4.36
−23∘C −20∘C −1.33 6.19
−20∘C −17∘C 11.42** 4.35
−17∘C −14∘C 14.80*** 4.73
−14∘C −11∘C 9.45 6.05
−11∘C −8∘C 7.94* 3.90
−8∘C −5∘C 10.36*** 3.29
−5∘C −2∘C 9.11* 5.35
−2∘C 1∘C 8.31*** 2.72
1∘C 4∘C −0.44 3.32
4∘C 7∘C 4.41 3.40
7∘C 10∘C 9.09*** 2.57
10∘C 13∘C −0.34 2.44
13∘C 16∘C 1.13 2.44
16∘C 19∘C −1.00 3.30
Above 25∘C 9.63*** 2.69
10 mm 20 mm −6.84 6.57
20 mm 100 mm 17.75 20.19
Time fixed effects Yes
Regional fixed effects Yes
Regional linear trends Yes
Number of observations 2,120
Rsq-within 0.87
Notes: Coef. and S.E. stand for coefficients and robust
standard errors that are clustered at a regional level. All
regressions are weighted by the corresponding population.
The temperature interval (19∘C, 25∘C] and the precipitation
interval [0 mm, 10 mm) are used as defaults.
***Significant level at 1%.
instead of 3∘ intervals (see Table B1 and Figure
B1 in Appendix S1).
Next, to show that the impact of extreme tem-
perature on violence is contemporaneous, we
introduce a distributed lag model with two lags
and two leads of temperature bins.22 It might be
the case that unobserved trends in regional crime
policies correlate with climate. In this case homi-
cides may rise/fall prior to extreme temperature
22. There is no general rule about how many lags
and leads of temperature bins to include in such a model.
Deschênes and Moretti (2009) analyze daily data on mortal-
ity and extreme temperatures in the US and conclude that
the effects of hot temperature (above 80∘F or ca. 26.6∘C)
are short-lived and dissipate within less than 30 days, while
the effects of cold temperature (below 20∘F or ca. -6.6∘C)
are longer but also dissipate within at most 90 days. There-
fore, we assume that 2 years prior/after the specific tem-
perature occurred is a sufficient time period to capture any
changes in violence. Moreover, including more lags and
leads of all temperature bins substantially reduces the degrees
of freedom in estimating the model. Recently, Schmid-
heiny and Siegloch (2020) show that distributed-lag models
are numerically equivalent to the event study designs with
binned endpoints.
days. If the model accounts for such trends ade-
quately, then leads in temperature bins should not
affect the current-period violent mortality. Also,
if it is indeed the immediate lack of comfort due
to extreme temperature that causes violence, then
the effects should be observed primarily in the
year of extreme temperatures, not in the subse-
quent years, that is, the lagged temperature bins
should have no strong effect on violent mortal-
ity. As shown in Table B2 in Appendix S1, the
estimated coefficients on leads and lags of both
extremely hot and extremely cold temperatures
do not affect current violent mortality, except for
the marginal significance of the coefficient on
the previous year hot temperature bin. This indi-
cates that no information is left unexplained in
the current-period violence that correlates with
the past and future periods’ temperature bins. The
coefficient on a current-period hot temperature
is also quantitatively similar to the one in the
main model (Table 2). Thus, the main model ade-
quately captures the impact of weather on vio-
lent mortality.
Until 2000 Russia was in a transition period
from the communist to market economy that was
characterized by institutional development, eco-
nomic reforms, political changes, and changes in
social life. To check the robustness of our results
we estimate Equation (1) for the post-transition
period (2000–2015) only, and then compare
the coefficients with the original model (1). As
shown in Table B3 in Appendix S1, in the models
with (1) and without (2) a transition period, the
coefficients on the above 25∘C temperature bin
are statistically significant. Even though the
magnitude of coefficients in the two models
differs slightly, the confidence intervals of the
estimates overlap, suggesting that they are not
statistically different from each other.
Furthermore, it might be the case that in
regions with higher current violence rates, we
should expect high violence rates in the next
year. For that purpose, we include the lagged vio-
lence rate in Equation (1). Model (3) in Table
B3 shows that the coefficient on the above 25∘C
temperature bin is statistically significant. Com-
paring two models (with (3) and without (1) the
lagged variable) we find that in the model with
the lagged violence rate the estimated coefficient
is smaller when compared to the original model.
However, the confidence intervals of the two esti-
mates overlap. As suggested in the economy-
climate change literature review by Dell, Jones,
and Olken (2014), one should be careful in using
endogenous variables in analysis since doing so
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FIGURE 6
Impact of Temperature on the Ratio of Violent Mortality to Nonviolent Mortality.
Notes: The dots represent the estimated coefficients on temperature bins with their 95% confidence interval. All regressions
are weighted by the corresponding population. The temperature interval (19∘C, 25∘C] and the precipitation interval [0 mm,
10 mm) are used as defaults.
TABLE 4
Testing for Mediating Channels
Channel Coef. S.E.
Baseline Above 25∘C 0.42*** 0.14
Below −23∘C 0.11 0.36
Rsq-within 0.84
Number of observations 1,675
Real wage ln(Real wage) 4.39 47.34
Above 25∘C 0.42** 0.16
Below −23∘C 0.16 0.38
Rsq-within 0.84
Number of observations 1,614
Unemployment Unemployment 1.99 2.23
Above 25∘C 0.35** 0.16
Below −23∘C 0.36 0.41
Rsq-within 0.82
Number of observations 1,867
Vodka consumption Vodka consumption −11.84 10.02
above 25∘C 0.62*** 0.13
below −23∘C −0.79* 0.42
Rsq-within 0.91
Number of observations 1,258
Education ln(Education) 11.95 15.49
Above 25∘C 0.44** 0.16
Below −23∘C 0.17 0.36
Rsq-within 0.84
Number of observations 1,617
Notes: Coef. and S.E. stand for coefficients and robust standard errors that are clustered at a regional level. All regressions are
weighted by the corresponding population. The temperature interval (19∘C, 25∘C] and the precipitation interval [0 mm, 10 mm)
are used as defaults. All models include all temperature and precipitation bins as in a baseline model, time and regional fixed
effects, and linear regional trends. Data are for the post-1995 period.
*Significant level at 10%; **significant level at 5%; ***significant level at 1%.
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may lead to biased estimates. This is exactly the
case, since the lagged violence also depends on
the weather of the previous period. Thus, if the
lagged dependent variable is included, the current
impact of weather is underestimated.
As stated above, only two thirds of regions are
affected by the temperature above 28∘C and the
annual average number of days with such tem-
perature range is 0.97. It would be interesting
to split the above 25∘C temperature bin into the
25–28∘C and above 28∘C temperature bins to
analyze whether the impact on violence is greater
for higher temperatures. As shown in Table B3,
in model (4) with above 28∘C temperature bin,
the impact of that temperature range is greater
than the impact of the above 25∘C temperature
bin, even though not statistically different. This
suggests that the estimates in this study should
be considered as lower bounds and if the num-
ber of days with higher temperature (i.e., above
28∘C) increases, the impact of climate change on
violence will be greater.
Finally, we estimate a count model, using
the empirical strategy suggested by Lindo
et al. (2019). The results are presented in Table
B4 in Appendix S1. As shown in this table, one
day with an average temperature above 25∘C
increases the number of violent deaths.
C. Heterogeneity across Age, Gender, and Days
of the Week
We then discriminate the impact of temper-
atures across age and gender groups and work
days and weekends. As shown in Table 5, one
day with an average temperature above 25∘C
increases the number of female and male victims
by 0.32 and 0.91, respectively. In relative terms,
those impacts correspond to 0.31% and 0.245%
increase in the number of female and male
victims, respectively.23 The results are also pre-
sented graphically in Figure A2 in Appendix S1.
As shown in Table 2, we find no evidence of
the impact of cold temperatures. In line with this
result, we also find no impact of cold tempera-
tures on males and females in Table 5. Thus, in
relative terms, we provide empirical evidence in
support of hypothesis H2a, that is, that the female
homicide rate is affected by extreme temperature
more than the male homicide rate, although only
23. The likelihood of being a victim is computed as
follows: for females is 0.31% = (0.32× 100/102.89) and for
males is 0.245% = (0.91×100/371.08). The numbers in a
denominator are taken from Figure 2, while the numbers in
a numerator are taken from Table 5.
in the case of hot temperatures. This is an inter-
esting finding, suggesting that global warming
has two dangerous implications for human well-
being: the number of victims may increase due
not only to an increasing number of hot days, but
also to a decreasing number of cold days.
We further distinguish four age groups: young
(15–24 y.o.), adult (25–44 y.o.), mature (45–59
y.o.), and old (above 60 y.o.). As shown in
Table 6, 1 day with an average temperature above
25∘C is significantly associated with more vio-
lence against females and males across all age
groups, except for young females. Quantitatively,
the impact of extreme weather is greater for
males than for females, with young and mature
males affected the most.24 Nevertheless, in rela-
tive terms the likelihood of victimization among
females is greater—0.9%, 0.88%, and 1% for
adults, mature, and old, respectively, when com-
pared to male counterparts—respectively 0.35%,
0.24%, and 0.41%, that is, between one third and
one half of female rates. Thus, we find only par-
tial support for hypothesis H2b.
In line with hypothesis H2c, we also find that
both males and females are more likely to fall
victim in response to temperature shocks during
weekends, with victimization rates about three
times greater than those during work days for
adult females and about two times greater for
mature males. The impact of temperature on
female victimization is significant and positive
for adult, mature, and old females during both
work days and weekends (see Table 7). As for
men, the coefficient is significantly different
from zero for all age groups. Even though males
are quantitatively more victimized than females,
in relative terms, the likelihood of being a vic-
tim during a weekend is greater for females
than for males. For instance, one weekend day
above 25∘C increases the likelihood of being
a victim among adult and mature females by
1% and 1.17%, respectively, while among male
counterparts this likelihood is 0.37% and 1.06%,
respectively.25 We also find no evidence of
an impact of work days versus weekend days
24. An article in The New York Times mentions the lower
association of females with violence, both as victims and
as perpetrators, together with the greater likelihood of being
victimized by someone they know, a partner, or a family
member (Lehren and Baker 2009).
25. This finding may be explained by high rates of
domestic violence. United Nations estimates are that about
14,000 women in Russia are killed annually by their husbands
(United Nations 2006). However, since we actually do not
observe whether violence happens on work days or on the
weekend, this explanation remains merely suggestive.
OTRACHSHENKO, POPOVA & TAVARES: WEATHER AND VIOLENCE IN RUSSIA 257
TABLE 5
Impact of Temperature on Total Homicide by Gender
Female Male
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
−23∘C and below −0.01 0.22 −0.51 0.82
−23∘C −20∘C −0.30 0.35 −1.02 0.94
−20∘C −17∘C −0.14 0.37 −0.88 1.38
−17∘C −14∘C 0.02 0.28 0.30 1.10
−14∘C −11∘C −0.47 0.39 −1.55 1.48
−11∘C −8∘C −0.24 0.18 −0.60 0.58
−8∘C −5∘C 0.00 0.22 −0.61 0.85
−5∘C −2∘C −0.21 0.23 −0.62 0.93
−2∘C 1∘C 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.68
1∘C 4∘C −0.11 0.18 −0.94 0.80
4∘C 7∘C −0.23 0.17 −0.55 0.71
7∘C 10∘C −0.10 0.17 −0.51 0.72
10∘C 13∘C −0.02 0.15 −0.56 0.58
13∘C 16∘C 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.34
16∘C 19∘C −0.07 0.11 −0.09 0.44
Above 25∘C 0.32*** 0.07 0.91*** 0.27
10 mm 20 mm −0.12 0.16 −0.90 0.61
20 mm 100 mm 0.35 0.49 1.40 1.87
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes
Regional linear trends Yes Yes
Number of observations 2,120 2,122
Rsq-within 0.75 0.74
Notes: Coef. and S.E. stand for coefficients and robust standard errors that are clustered at a regional level. All regressions are
weighted by the corresponding population. The temperature interval (19∘C, 25∘C] and the precipitation interval [0 mm, 10 mm)
are used as defaults.
***Significant level at 1%.
with temperature below −23∘C on homicide for
either gender.
D. Years of Life Lost by a Victim
According to McCollister, French, and
Fang (2010), the total social costs of crim-
inal acts consist of tangible and intangible
costs. In the case of murders, tangible costs
include victim costs (a present value of life time
earnings), criminal system costs (i.e., police
protection cost, legal and adjudication costs,
and the convicted perpetrators’ correction costs),
and crime carrier costs (productivity losses
associated with perpetrators of crimes). Intan-
gible costs include corrected risk-of-homicide
costs that are willingness to pay to prevent vio-
lence. According to McCollister, French, and
Fang (2010), the total social costs of one murder
in the United States are about 9 million USD in
2008 prices.
We compute years of life lost by a victim that
are due to the impact of one hot day (above 25∘C).
That is, how many years a victim would live if
she/he were not murdered. This measure is equiv-
alent to victim costs suggested by McCollister,
French, and Fang (2010) and contributes 8.2%
to the total social costs (McCollister, French, and
Fang 2010). Our estimates should be considered
as a lower bound of the total social costs. The
results are in Table 8, in which columns 1–3
correspond to the estimated number of deaths of
females, males, and both genders based on the
impact of 1 day with temperature above 25∘C
(hot) from Table 6. Columns 4–6 stand for the
years of life lost by a victim of a particular age
group. Those columns are based on the statistics
of the WHO (2016) on life expectancy of partic-
ular age groups. Columns 7–9 stand for the total
number years of life lost due to the impact of one
hot day.
Table 8 shows that the greatest number of
victims associated with 1 day above 25∘C is
among adult and mature females and males—10
and 8 female victims, and 23 and 25 male victims,
respectively. The greatest total number of years
lost is observed among the adult females and
males, which is the most economically active
and reproductive age group. Overall, we find
that the total number of years lost among all
age groups is 642 and 1,579 for females and
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Table 6
Impact of One Day with Temperatures above 25∘C and below −23∘C by Gender and Age Group
Both Gender Female Male
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Impact of 1 day with temperatures above 25∘C
All ages 0.60*** 0.15 0.32*** 0.07 0.91*** 0.27
Young (15–24) 0.44** 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.80*** 0.27
Adult (25–44) 0.76*** 0.23 0.46*** 0.13 1.06** 0.42
Mature (45–59) 1.19*** 0.30 0.55*** 0.16 1.93*** 0.52
Old (60+) 0.48*** 0.16 0.36** 0.13 0.74** 0.31
Impact of 1 day with temperatures below −23∘C
All ages −0.29 0.50 −0.01 0.22 −0.51 0.82
Young (15–24) −0.41 0.41 −0.05 0.16 −0.76 0.71
Adult (25–44) −0.47 0.73 −0.13 0.31 −0.69 1.20
Mature (45–59) −0.83 0.94 −0.20 0.44 −1.44 1.54
Old (60+) −0.32 0.47 0.05 0.30 −0.91 0.89
Number of observations 2,120 2,120 2,122
Notes: The estimated coefficients on the above 25∘C bin and the below −23∘C bin for a particular age and gender group
are from Equation (1). Coef. and S.E. stand for coefficients and robust standard errors that are clustered at a regional level.
Regressions for each gender and age group are estimated separately. Each regression includes all temperature and precipitation
bins, regional and year fixed effects, and regional time trends, and is weighted by the corresponding population. Full results are
available from the authors upon request.
**Significant level at 5%; ***significant level at 1%.
Table 7
Impact of a Work Day and a Weekend Day with Temperature above 25∘C by Gender and Age Group
Both Gender Female Male
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Impact of a work day with temperatures above 25∘C
All ages 0.75*** 0.18 0.37*** 0.09 1.18*** 0.31
Young (15–24) 0.74*** 0.21 0.02 0.13 1.41*** 0.37
Adult (25–44) 0.94*** 0.29 0.53*** 0.18 1.37** 0.53
Mature (45–59) 1.34*** 0.35 0.59** 0.23 2.22*** 0.58
Old (60+) 0.60** 0.21 0.46** 0.18 0.91** 0.41
Impact of a weekend day with temperatures above 25∘C
All ages 1.48** 1.55 0.89*** 0.25 2.13** 0.93
Young (15–24) 0.69 0.45 0.31 0.23 1.02 0.79
Adult (25–44) 1.82** 0.83 1.40*** 0.39 2.20 1.43
Mature (45–59) 3.50*** 1.02 1.66*** 0.61 5.60*** 1.71
Old (60+) 1.04** 0.49 0.63 0.40 1.91* 1.04
Number of observations 2,120 2,120 2,122
Notes: The estimated coefficients on the above 25∘C bin for a particular age and gender group are from Equation (1). Coef.
and S.E. stand for coefficients and robust standard errors that are clustered at a regional level. Regressions for each gender
and age group are estimated separately. Each regression includes all temperature and precipitation bins, regional and year fixed
effects, and regional time trends, and is weighted by the corresponding population. Full results are available from the authors
upon request.
*Significant level at 10%; **significant level at 5%; ***significant level at 1%.
males, respectively. We also compute the average
number of years lost per victim. According to our
results, if not killed, a female victim would live
an additional 26.75 years, while a male victim
would live 25.06 years more. Thus, even though
there are more males than females among the
victims at all age groups, except for the elderly,
females have a greater cost in terms of years
lost per se.
VII. CONCLUSION
The importance of climate change is hard
to exaggerate. However, precise estimates of
the social consequences of high temperatures
are rare. We rely on heretofore unused data
from a novel Russian dataset covering three
decades of information on temperatures and
violent mortality to estimate the impact of hot
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TABLE 8
Estimated Number of Victims of One Day with Temperatures above 25∘C by Gender and Age Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Estimated Number of Deaths Years of Life Lost Person-Years of Life Lost
Age Groups Female Male Both Gender Female Male Both Gender Female Male Both Gender
Young (15–24) 1* 9 9 57.2 45.8 51.5 57.2* 412.20 463.50
Adult (25–44) 10 23 33 38.6 29.2 33.9 386 672 1,118.70
Mature (45–59) 8 25 33 25.3 18.2 21.8 202 455.00 718
Old (above 60) 6 6 12 17.2 12.4 14.8 54 40.18 177.60
Total 24 63 87 642 1,579 2,478
Years of life lost per death 26.75 25.06 28.48
Notes: * is based on nonsignificant coefficient. Columns 1–3 are computed by multiplying the estimated impact of 1 day above 25∘C from
Table 6 by the average regional population of each gender and age group during the 1989–2015 period. Columns 4–6 stand for the number of
years of life lost by each gender and age group computed as a difference between life expectancy and the upper age limit of a particular age group.
Columns 7–9 are computed by multiplying columns 1–3 and 4–6.
and cold temperatures on violence. We show that
the temperature–violence relationship in Russia
is J-shaped, that is, extremely hot temperatures
increase violent mortality, while extremely cold
temperatures have no effect. In contrast, the
nonviolent mortality is affected by most tem-
perature ranges. This finding suggests that the
mechanisms behind the temperature–violence
relationship go beyond the biological explana-
tions that may drive the effect of temperature on
nonviolent mortality and may include economic
and social factors too. We also uncover that most
victimization occurs on weekends for individuals
aged between 45 and 59 years old. Males are
more often victimized, especially men between
45 and 59 years old, but females are significantly
more victimized on weekends.
The consistent relevance of economic condi-
tions, including unemployment and alcohol con-
sumption, as intermediating factors for the impact
of weather on violence suggests that we are cap-
turing an important social mechanism that medi-
ates how temperature translates into violence.
Our findings suggest that higher unemployment
and more widespread vodka consumption may
increase the impact of extreme temperatures
on violence. However, it is important to note
that socioeconomic conditions are only possible
mediating channels since they are themselves
affected by the weather conditions. Overall, our
results imply that the intensity and type of social
interactions, which vary across age and gender,
and between work days and weekdays, are impor-
tant factors determining the social cost of tem-
perature shocks. The importance of these results
cannot be overstated, especially as the effects of
climate change may become more acute.
Our findings might be interesting to policy
makers in other regions and countries. First,
we find that victimization due to both hot and
cold temperature shocks might be mitigated by
improving job opportunities in a region. Also,
regulating spirits consumption may help to mit-
igate the harmful impact of weather shocks,
though only cold ones. The increasing relevance
of climate change, and the vulnerability of devel-
oping countries to its effects, calls for further
work on the social determinants of victimhood
and the gender and age inequalities it generates.
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